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Family business is the most prevalent type of firms in the world, and one crucial topic around it 
is the succession issue. Considering that family business in China differs from other regions in terms 
of performance, the purpose of this thesis is to discuss which one is the optimal succession choice in 
Chinese family business, family CEOs, or professional CEOs? 
Some previous researches show that family business managed by family CEOs have worse 
management quality and economic outcome. These early researches provide four reasons to explain 
the inferiority of family CEOs, which are (1) perception: family CEOs lack awareness of their poor 
performance; (2) nonpecuniary benefits the family CEOs enjoyed which impede the growth of 
business; (3) the cost incurred by the implicit commitment of family CEOs drag down the performance. 
(4) passing down the business only to offspring narrow down the CEO choices. Knowing the worse 
performance of family CEOs, why do the outgoing controllers of family business still appoint family 
CEOs rather than professional CEOs? It is because of (1) cultural reasons such as family value within 
the family business; (2) limited access to outside capable professional manager; and (3) institutional 
constraints such as weak legal protection.  
The literatures mentioned above contend that family businesses with separation of ownership and 
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management are more efficient than those having family CEOs in firms, but none of these researches 
analyze China’s case specifically. Some Chinese researchers who study the performance of Chinese 
family businesses find a different result. Their researches show that family CEOs in China outperform 
non-family CEOs. The better performance of family CEOs in China could be explained as (1) size, 
because smaller size business has advantages in current china’s context, and family businesses in 
China are still in their early stage; (2) China’s one-child policy bring less infighting; (3) undeveloped 
talent pool in China; (4) political connection plays an important role in running business in China. 
Even though these researches reveal that family CEOs outperform outside CEOs in China, it does 
not necessarily mean handing down the family business to family members is the optimal option. 
Because the context which favors family CEOs is dynamic and will change in the future. For example 
(1) along with the growing size of business, family business may need more help from outside; (2) the 
talent market might be developed in the future; (3) if the transparency of government goes up, the 
political connection might be less important. Therefore, the hypothesis can be concluded as: family 
CEOs is suitable for small business in China at the current stage, but it is better to have professional 
CEOs for big companies; in the future, hiring outside CEOs will be more widely applied even in small 
business along with social and economic development; thus, hiring professional CEOs to separate 
ownership and management is still the ultimate goal. However, merely hiring professional CEOs does 
not ensure better performance since one crucial issue of professional CEOs is agency problem; 
therefore, a functional corporate governance structure should be in place.  
 As a successful and traditional Chinese family business managed by an outsider, Midea is an 
excellent example of how a big family business led by a professional CEO could achieve huge success 
under the supervising of functional corporate governance. The data collected from Wind Financial 
Database show that Midea's equity market performance and financial performance improved 
dramatically after succession to the outside CEO. Midea’s governance structure proves how a family 
business could leverage the talent of professional CEOs with minimizing the agency problem and 
tunneling activities. Midea’s success consists with the hypothesis that the separation of ownership and 
management under monitoring of well-designed corporate governance is the optimal goal for big 
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Chinese family business. 
             In conclusion, the outperformance of family CEOs in Chinese family firms is a temporary 
result caused by certain contexts. The family business succession is a complicated topic that one 
solution does not fit all different types of family businesses. Therefore, from both size dimension and 
development phase dimension, the final statements include three situations: (1) the small family firms 
have no necessary to separate ownership and management at the current stage in China because of the 
advantages of family CEOs such as less cost and quick reaction to market; hence complete corporate 
governance is not essential for them; (2) for big Chinese family business especially for those have 
business over the world, they are less impacted by political factor and have a large amount resources 
to access capable professional managers, so it is better for them to have professional CEOs because of 
efficiency improvement; (3) along with the social and economic development, if the problems of 
corruption and unmatured talent market are alleviated in the future, hiring outside CEO become less 
risky and cost, finally the separation of ownership then is easier and more necessary to achieve even 
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Family firms are a predominate business organization type in the world, and it plays an 
important role in the world economy. Based on Tharawat Magazine (2014), the family firms 
contribute over 70% of global GDP if defining family businesses as businesses are majority-owned 
by a single family’s members. The data from Family Business Year Book (Ernst & Young, 2014) 
shows that 85% of the companies in Asia-pacific region are family-owned businesses. Besides, 
family business also creates numerous job opportunities. For example, family businesses in the 
United States employ 63% of the workforce (Family Enterprise USA, 2011). According to European 
Family Businesses Organisation (2020), the number of jobs created by European family business 
accounts for 40%-50% of all jobs in Europe. In China, family business is also a force to be reckoned 
with in the economy. Due to China’s special economy system, political context, and Confucianism 
culture, family business in China shows some different characteristics compared to its counterpart in 
the rest of the world.  
Just as family business in other regions in the world. The significance of family business in 
Chinese economic development cannot be neglected. As a middle-income country, China has a high 
ratio of family business. According to People’s Daily (2012), private enterprises account for 96% of 
total enterprises in China, and 85.4% of these private enterprises are family businesses. The data 
from Forbes China (2017) shows that by April 30, 2017, among 3,204 listed companies in China, 
1,112 companies are family businesses, accounting for 34.7%. Besides the importance of family 
business in China, its succession is frequently mentioned. 
Since the Chinese government has deployed the economic reform and opening-up policy from 
the late 1970s, Chinese economy has experienced huge growth over the past forty years. The private 
economy as one pillar of the economy booming in China, its succession is frequently discussed 
because the founders of most private companies are confronting retirement recently (most of the 
first-generation Chinese entrepreneurs are in their 60s and 70s). China’s particular demographic 
statistic also shows some interesting facts about the succession process. Lemos and Scur (2018) state 
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the gender of next-generation highly relates to family control (family member as managers). The 
data from Central Intelligence Agency (2020) shows the sex ratio in China is 1.11 male to female, 
which ranks number 3rd high among all the countries in the world, only behind Liechtenstein and 
Northern Mariana Islands (US). The high male-female ratio in China suggests a potentially high 
possibility to hand down the family firm to next-generation compare to other countries, which makes 
it interesting to analyze the Chinese family business succession issue. 
Two different succession ways are usually considered when the current family firm owner 
decides to pass down the business. One is passing down both management and ownership, which 
means the next generation is both owner and manager of the family business. Another one is handing 
over just ownership, which means the next generation only keeps the ownership and hiring 
professionals to manage the business. The early literatures generally find that the family businesses 
which chose the first succession way usually have lower efficiency and worse financial performance, 
while the firms chose the latter one outperforms the first one. However, most of the hypotheses and 
evidence from these literatures are based on family firms in non-Chinese countries. Some Chinese 
scholars contend that for several reasons, Chinese family firms with having the second-generation 
control the business have better performance. The inconsistency between the early researches makes 
identifying an appropriate corporate governance and organization structure among two succession 
ways very interesting to study. 
This thesis aims to discuss the best solution of family business succession choice among two 
options (family CEOs and professional CEOs) in China through some literature review and case 
discussion. Based on the analysis of the previous studies and a case of a successful family business, 
Midea Group, the thesis concludes that even though family CEOs fits small family business in China 
at the current stage, the ultimate goal is still applying professional CEOs under the monitoring of 
functional corporate governance in the succession of Chinese family business.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the earlier literature to compare 
two different family business succession choices: professional CEOs and family CEOs. With 
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understanding the better management practice and financial performance of family business with 
professional CEOs in the rest of world, Chapter 3 analyzes a unique case, family business in China, 
and proposes that family CEOs works best for small business at the current stage, professional CEOs 
under functional corporate governance is an ultimate goal even in China’s context. Chapter 4 uses 
the case of Midea Group, a successful Chinese family business led by a professional CEO, to prove 
the last chapter's argument. Chapter 5 presents the concluding remark.  
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2. Comparison between two models: professional CEOs and family CEOs  
Based on literature review, section 2.1 states the management efficiency differences between 
family CEOs and non-family CEOs, then section 2.2 describes the reasons for worse management 
quality and economic outcomes caused by family CEOs. Section 2.3 of this chapter discusses that with 
knowing the superior of professional CEO, why do the outgoing CEOs of family businesses not pass 
down business to professional CEOs. 
Section 2.1.  Management efficiency between two different types of CEOs  
Many researches show, family business managed by family CEOs have worse management 
quality and economic outcome. In these studies, one frequently used dataset is called World 
Management Survey (WMS) which is an international dataset designed to measure the quality of 
management practice of medium and large manufacturing companies across different countries.  So 
far, WMS has conducted more than 20,000 interviews in 35 countries. Lemos and Scur (2018) studied 
the relationship between dynastic family control (appointing a family CEO in family business), 
internal firm organization and firm outcome. In their paper, with analyzing the sample of 12,548 
companies from WMS dataset, their test shows that the distribution of management quality of dynastic 
family firm (owned and led by a family member) is statistically different from the management quality 
of family firm with professional CEO as well as non-family business. By applying and correlation 
evidence from ordinary least square and casual evidence from instrumental variables approach, the 
researchers prove the worse management of dynastic family business is caused by the succession of 
family CEO. 
Based on a sample with 13,436 companies across 32 countries in the world, including both 
developed and developing countries, Bennett et al. (2016) also generate a similar conclusion. Their 
study supports that founder CEOs controlled firms have lower management scores to other forms of 
enterprises. Unsurprisingly, the research also shows management quality and the economic outcome 
has a significant and positive correlation. In their paper, Bandiera et al. (2018) analyzed the number 
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of working hours difference between family CEOs and professional CEOs (1,114 CEOs from 
manufacturing firms across six countries: Brazil, France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom), and 
they contended firms run by family CEOs are on average less productive than the those managed by 
professional CEOs. 
Section 2.2.  Reasons why family CEOs have worse management quality and outcome 
Then, why do family firms with family CEOs have worse management quality? Early 
researches provided several reasons.  
The first one is perception. CEOs lack awareness of their poor performance. The managers 
may be overconfident and overestimate his or her capability on running the company. In this case, 
they are satisfied with their current leading style and management practice and are not willing to adopt 
better management practices. Bennett et al. (2016) confirmed this hypothesis. By leveraging the self-
reported measure collected from World Management Survey, their study suggested that the founder 
CEOs tend to have higher self-score in management scores than other types of CEOs. Additionally, 
their research also points out that “the lower managerial scores of founder CEO firms are associated 
with managers’ systematic lack of awareness of the weakness of their firms’ management quality” 
(p.173).  
The second explanation is the nonpecuniary benefit. The study of Bennett et al. (2016) also 
find that even the family CEOs realize their poor performance, they are reluctant to apply formalized 
managerial practice because they enjoy the private benefit of controlling the firms such as the 
discretion on human resources. The study by Hurst & Pugsley (2011) finds that the nonpecuniary 
benefit is the most important reason to establish a business for many entrepreneurs. Applying the 
standardized managerial practice means less discretion on company’s operation, and it hurts family 
CEOs’ private benefits. Therefore, many family CEOs are not willing to adopt a more efficient 
managerial practice. Realizing private benefits usually implies sacrificing company’s resources. One 
typical example is hiring and rewarding persons based on personal preference rather than the capability 
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and performance of employees. The relation-oriented culture may strongly motivate the family CEOs 
to do so. If CEOs hire and reward persons based on family and friend affiliation rather than their 
performance, it will impact the morale in company, which finally impede the company’s growth. 
The third reason is implicit commitment. Unlike other types of enterprises, the relationship 
between employee and employer of many family businesses is not pure labor relation. Some implicit 
relationships behind the surface, and the relationship between the two parties are complex. Besides 
just fulfilling what the labor contract states, the CEOs have to offer some implicit commitments to 
employees such as taking care of employee’s family members. Since the family firms have a closer 
relationship with their employees than other companies, it is necessary for them to take care of 
employees' families even if they do not work for this firm. The cost caused by implicit commitment 
could be one downside of implicit commitment lead to worse performance of family firms. Another 
form of implicit commitment is that family firms offer greater job security to employees (Bassanini et 
al. 2010). In this case, compare to other companies, it is not easy for a family firm to fire low ability 
workers to improve efficiency.  
The fourth reason for management differences between the two models is that the succession 
to only offspring narrows down the CEO choices since outgoing family CEOs can only choose 
successors from their children. Without the successor choosing limitation, the firm could be passed to 
any capable manager from both outside and inside, and a larger talent pool means increasing the 
possibility of success. Some may argue that managerial talent can be easily transmitted within the 
family members; thus, handing down the business to the next generation has no problem with talent 
pool since the offspring of current managers are capable enough. However, research shows it is not 
that case. Bloom et. Al (2011) state “sons who become CEOs usually have poorer college results and 
are much younger than other CEOs”. 
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Section 2.3.  Reasons for still Choosing Family CEOs 
Even though many researchers have stated that having the ownership and controlling 
concentrated on the same person is inferior to the separation of ownership and management, still lots 
of current owners of family firms choose to hand down the business to next generation and appoint 
their children as the managers of the firm for three reasons stated below. 
The first reason is culture. Different types of persons have different utility functions, and their 
preferences are not the same. Culture plays an important role in deciding preferences and utility 
functions. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) analyzed a sample of established size manufacturing companies 
across different countries from United Nations Industry Development Organization (UNIDO) 
database. Their analysis finds stronger family value has a significant correlation with high self-
employment rate and smaller firm size. Therefore, the researchers contend that the outgoing family 
business controllers may prioritize the survival of the family firm for the next generation and in turn 
forgo growth opportunities. In this case, even the family managers knowing passing down the business 
to their children is not the best option regarding the firm's financial performance, they will still choose 
to do so since it benefits their personal interests. In this sense, family values in certain cultures create 
inefficiency in running a business due to the introduction of nonmonetary factors into the current 
family business owner’s utility function. Sometimes, the family members’ attitudes to the family 
business also force the owner to hand down the business to offspring. In some cultures, family 
members treat the family business as a legacy, and it is an asset that can only be controlled by family 
members. If the next generation insists that they want to manage and control the family business, the 
current owner usually has no choice but to agree on them if he or she does not want to incur the dispute 
within the family. 
The second reason leads to the concentration of ownership and management is having limited 
access to professional managers market. The thin talent pool causes hiring outside managers not 
attractive for family business since it has fewer chances to find a capable professional manager. 
Finding, screening, and recruiting a qualified CEO is not only costly but also time-consuming. 
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Compare with the complex recruiting process with unknowing risk, appointing the family member 
whose ability and traits are known by outgoing family CEOs to be the CEO is more efficient and 
saving time and money. Thus, the outside CEO has fewer comparative advantages than the family 
CEO when the talent pool is thin and the labor market is not developed. On the other hand, managing 
a family business may not be attractive for some capable managers. The pecuniary reward does not 
fully satisfy these ambitious managers if they pursue working in an enterprise that they can totally 
control. In both cases, lacking access to those capable outside managers could lead to family business 
be handed down to the next generation. 
The third reason is environmental or institutional constraints such as the legal system and trust 
among society. According to Bertrand and Schoar (2006), “if formal institutions regarding investor 
protection, contract enforcement or property rights protection are weak or nonexistent, strong family 
ties may provide a second-best solution for the development of economic activity” (p.92). (notice that 
the data analysis only offers moderate support for this idea in this study). In an inefficient labor market 
with a weak legal system, fraud and betrayal happen more frequently, a dysfunctional legal system 
cannot protect the interest of firms and the investors (owner). In this situation, trust within family 
works as a substitute for weak legal protection to protect family business owner from devious outside 
managers. Thus, appointing a family member as the CEO becomes the optimal choice under the 
inadequate legal protection setting since it is the best way to protect the family business from moral 
hazard happened between the family and outside manager. 
Although knowing that family CEOs is not the optimal option for the family business, the current 
owners still have to appoint them as the leader in firms for the reasons mentioned above. So far, this 
chapter analyzed two different types of CEOs in family business succession, but it is mainly based on 





3. Family Business in China 
This chapter first provides some development history regarding family business in China in 
section 3.1. Then, section 3.2 describes a unique phenomenon in Chinese family business compared 
with family business described in early literature, the better performance of family business with 
family CEOs, and five reasons that caused it. Section 3.3 and 3.4 analyze the question of what is the 
best solution to Chinese family business’s succession process with considering the involvement of 
corporate governance in the process. 
Section 3.1.  Development of Chinese family business 
Chinese private economy started in the late 1970s when China's leader decided to implement 
economic reform. Then, the Chinese economy system transformed from state ownership and central 
planning to market-oriented during that time. The development of private economy spawned many 
private enterprises, and most of them are family businesses. In the early stage of economic reform, 
most private enterprises are very small. The financial system in China was far from perfect, and 
starting funds of enterprises are mainly provided by private persons rather than banking or other 
financial institutions. Since the labor market was also not efficient and the size of businesses is not 
large, the founder has no opportunity and necessary to find partners (co-founders), so the owner of 
firms usually was also the managers during that period. Some owners may hire other family members 
such as siblings to help them manage the company, but most of these family members have no share 
or a small portion of share in the company and only manage part of business, the founders were still 
the CEOs. All these characteristics, concentrated ownership, founder CEOs and family members 
servicing in the company showed the embryo of Chinese family business.  
Section 3.2.  Better performance of family CEOs in China 
Although family business in China shows the same basic characteristics with it in other 
countries, it has different performance compare with its counterparts. The literatures mentioned early 
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contends that family businesses with separation of ownership and management are more efficient than 
those having family CEOs, but none of these researches analyze China’s case specifically. Some 
Chinese researchers who study on the performance of Chinese family business find a different result 
that family CEOs in China actually outperform non-family CEOs. For example, by analyzing data 
provided by China Stock Market & Accounting Research and the Wind Financial Database over the 
period from 2003 to 2011, a study by Xu et al. (2015) shows that “the second generation's involvement 
in the decision process is beneficial to firm performance. Specifically, operating return on total assets 
(OROA) and operating return on sales (OROS) for firms with the second generation as the 
CEO/chairman (director) are 3.1% (3.2%) and 6.9% (6.7%) higher” (p.244). Forbes (2012) also finds 
that Chinese listed family business outperforms other listed companies in China (including private 
listed non-family companies) in terms of profitability and growth rate. Chinese family business with 
family CEOs may have similar problems as its counterpart in other regions such as lacking awareness 
of poor performance, implicit commitment and limited CEO choices. However, other unique 
contextual factors around them may bring about better performance of Chinese family CEOs, and 
these four factors are shown below. 
The first one is the size. Considering the short history of the family business in modern China, 
in contrast to the family business in other regions, many Chinese family businesses are in their early 
stages. For example, by analyzing the nationwide business statistical data such as the number of 
registered private enterprises and employees, Wan (1998) concludes the majority of family businesses 
in China are still in their early stages. The size is small, and the organization structure is simple. Family 
members control both ownership and management benefits on the quick decision on significant events, 
and it saves time for the decision-making process and the cost. Compare with the big and mature 
company, quick decision making and swift reaction to market change are the advantages for small 
businesses. Introducing outside CEOs in family business may hurt the benefits of small business. 
Therefore, the existence of a large percentage of early-stage business in China could be one 
explanation of why concentrating on ownership and management outperform other companies in terms 
of their profitability and growth rate.  
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The second factor that makes Chinese family business different from family business in other 
regions is the one-child policy. In the same year of launching economy reform, the Chinese 
government also implemented the one-child policy, which makes the family business succession 
process in China is unique. Unlike other regions’ family firms whose potential successors could be 
more than one child, if the outgoing CEOs of Chinese family businesses decide to hand down the firm 
to next generation, they have only one choice. The unique one-child policy causes less infighting in 
the succession process. Sibling fights for family assets in wealthy family frequently happens in the 
world. It is obvious that internal fight in the family business has a severe impact on firm’s daily 
operation. Even if the dispute and bloodletting are finally settled, it usually ends with the partition of 
family assets, which impedes business growth. Compared with the multiple-child family, the 
advantage of the one-child policy in succession process is to bring less infighting within the firm; 
therefore, resulting in less internal friction and more resources for growth. However, some people may 
argue that less offspring also means more limited successor choices compare with family business in 
other regions. One explanation for this argument could be that the impact of narrowing choices of the 
successor is far less than it of family infighting. It might because the one-child family pays more 
attention to the education of the child since he or she has plays a more important role in the family 
compare with the child with siblings. If parents put more effort into cultivating the child, especially 
their talent in management, the possibility of one-child mature into a capable family business manager 
will increase. Additionally, the adverse consequence of appointing an incapable successor in business 
is gradually showing in the future (as long as the successor is not extremely bad at management. If the 
successor is, the founder is more likely hiring outside managers). On the other hand, the effect of 
infight is instant. Family businesses with infighting have a dramatic drop in financial performance or 
even bankruptcy after the succession. 
The third reason is access to capable professional managers. The talent pool in the market is 
also a consideration when it comes to deciding CEOs type in Chinese family firms. Although higher 
education in China has developed for more than 30 years, it is still not enough compared with 
developed countries. The quality of outside managers is still questionable. The mechanism of talent 
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market also needs to be improved.  According to Xing & Wang (2014), the professional managers 
market in China lacks a complete and unified market system and a neutral agency that assesses 
professional managers' ability. The market also has no governance institution to monitoring and 
discipline the devious managers. For example, the devious managers who hurt his or her last employer 
do not receive instant punishment, and then the new employer may not know what he or she did before 
without the existence of governance for the talent market. Therefore, the Chinese talent market, 
especially for senior managers are still in a mess. Lacking information and transparency of the market 
leads to difficulty for the family business to find suitable outside managers. On the other hand, for 
some historical reasons, many family businesses were involved in some dirty activities such as fraud 
and cheating on taxes, which caused the bad image of private enterprises among the public (Jing, 2014). 
The bad reputation of family business in China makes it is unattractive for capable professional 
managers. Finally, reverse selection happens in the talent market. Competent and brilliant professional 
managers choose to either work for other firms or establish their own business, and family businesses 
only have the option to hire those with low capability. It finally causes the family business with family 
CEOs to outperform those with outsides CEOs since family CEOs do not have such problems. 
The fourth reason is the political connection. It also works as a factor that makes Chinese 
family businesses outperform other enterprises. The research by Xu et al. (2015) reveals that “a 
founder's political connectedness is a critical factor in deciding to appoint a second-generation member 
as the CEO or chairman or a director in the family firm” (p.258). In the context where the extent of 
corruption is great, and the volume of relationship-oriented transaction is large, the connection with 
local government is essential for business. According to data provided by Transparency International, 
China’s corruption perceptions index ranks 80th in the world, it is higher than other major economies, 
and it potentially leads to having family CEOs in business meaningful. A good relationship with local 
officers provides many advantages. For example, the firms whose controlling person has close 
relations with officers are easier to get favorable policies and get advantages on government biding. 
In a country with powerful government such as China, the local government can even control the local 
financial industry, including bank and private equity. Firms that are close to the government are easier 
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to get bank loans with low-interest rate and various equity investments to support the company. Unlike 
in developed countries where companies have to be big enough to capture government officers' 
attention, companies do not need to be big enough to access senior offices to get support from financial 
institutions in China. Therefore, the threshold of access to political resources is low in this country. 
Even the small companies are possible to build connections with local officers, and the return is ample. 
Because political connection in China is a personal relationship built by the founders or the current 
family controllers of business, the founder’s personal relationship is easier to transmit to other family 
members compare with outsiders, and it gives the reason to the controller of the family business to 
appoint family members as the next CEO. 
Section 3.3.  Is the family CEO the best solution to Chinese family business?  
Although the research reveals that family CEOs outperform outside CEOs in China, it does 
not necessarily mean handing down the family business to family members is superior to hiring 
professional managers all the time. From the size dimension, based on the analysis of success factors 
of Chinese family CEOs mentioned above, having family CEOs in China is the right choice only for 
those traditional family businesses which are small. Compare with large family firms, the small family 
businesses are vulnerable to political impact and tunneling activities, and their resources to access 
talent pool is limited. Having family CEOs can protect them from these problems. But the big 
companies do not have such issues; hence, they should not adopt family CEOs. From the development 
phase dimension, the social context is dynamic; it is possible that the context suitable for the dynastic 
family business no longer exists. For example, China is reconsidering its one-child policy, and more 
infighting may happen within the family business in the future. Therefore, the superiority of family 
CEOs only works in certain context, and it is not fair to say Family CEOs is always the best solution 
to family businesses. The ultimate goal is still separating ownership and management. The detailed 
three explanations are shown below.  
Firstly, as explained early, because many Chinese family businesses are in their early stages, 
they usually focus on niche markets. Therefore, the resources required to operate the firms in the small 
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market are limited. Family members provide most of the production factors of firms such as labor and 
management intelligence. Professional managers are unnecessary in this stage, so it is possible for one 
family to run a company. Additionally, the Chinese family value also improves firms' efficiency when 
it is run by one family when the firm is small. Based on Xing & Wang (2014), when the firm is under 
the family’s control, implicit rules that are easily recognized by family members are established based 
on traditional Chinese family values. Because of the inherent connection, everyone within the family 
firms can easily understand other’s working styles and habits without much communication cost. It 
finally lowers the friction in their working as well as the cost of management. Along with the firm 
growing bigger, for ambitious family firms, focusing on one niche market is no more an option. 
Entering a new market requires more sophisticated resources and knowledge to manage the firm, the 
resources and capability owned by current family managers is no longer fit company’s needs. The 
number of capable family members to run such a complex business is also limited, then looking for 
help from outside is essential. Hiring professional managers is a crucial step to do. The outside 
managers usually are trained by college, so they have a well-developed management system in mind. 
Additionally, they also have the necessary experience to run the business and offer the essential factors 
not owned by the current family management team. Despite other institutional factors, hiring 
professional managers still benefits family firms when their businesses grow into complex. 
Secondly, an inefficient talent market is another reason why outgoing family CEOs do not 
want to choose professional managers mentioned early. The untransparent talent market leads to 
adverse selection, so the possibility of finding a suitable manager from the talent market is low, and it 
increases the risk for family businesses that are going to hire outside managers. Fighting with these 
devious managers is a tough task for smaller family firms. When the small firms hire these professional 
managers, they place big hope on these outsiders, they usually make the wish that the professional 
managers could bring them into a new phase. Therefore, many outside CEOs are in a strong position 
facing firms. Plus, when the disputes happen between professional managers and the firm, a well-
trained manager knows how to use the legal weapon to protect his or her interest, no matter whether 
the interest is legitimate. Hence, hiring outside CEOs is a high-risk and high-cost thing for small firms. 
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However, it is not that case for big companies. When big firms hire outside managers, slight growth 
is good enough, and they do not expect a breakout. In this case, firms in a stronger position. Compare 
with smaller family firms, large family businesses have more resources to protect their interest from 
professional manager’s betray. The organization structure of big firms is well-developed, the strict 
internal control and strong legal department can efficiently prevent outside CEOs’ tunneling activities. 
Additionally, a global family company has more access to capable professional managers. Their talent 
market is not limited in China, and attracting talented people from developed talent market is not 
difficult for them. 
Thirdly, in the last section, the political connection is mentioned as one explanation of why 
appointing family CEOs makes businesses have better performance than hiring outside CEOs. As 
stated earlier, political connections work best when corruption is high and relation-oriented 
transactions play an essential role in the market. Along with the social and economic development in 
China, it is possible that the percentage of relation-oriented transactions will also decrease in the future 
and corruption problems will be largely mitigated. The data from Transparency International (2019) 
shows that China has been making an effort to solve the corruption problem. Its corruption perception 
score has continuously increased from 36 points in 2014 to 41points in 2019 (higher score means high 
transparency and less corruption). On the other hand, either because of the size growing or the 
characteristics of industry (for some technology industry, having global business relations are 
unavoidable), some family businesses may enter the global market and have business overseas where 
the political connection cannot be easily built as in China. In this sense, the importance of political 
connection decreases. Additionally, having a modern corporate governance structure (which is 
separation of ownership and management) have significant meaning for these global companies. A 
good governance structure could attract investors from oversea. It also gives company’s potential 
partners such as suppliers and customers the confidence to do business with these companies. Oversea 
investors, supplier and customers are crucial for Chinese firms which do business globally. For these 




Based on the analysis above, in China, even though appointing second-generation CEOs 
shows better company financial performance than appointing outsiders, it is not the best solution all 
the time. Combining the analysis from both development phase dimension and size dimension, ae time. 
At the current stage, family CEOs is suitable for small business in China. Still, for big companies with 
many resources and complicated business models, it is better to have professional CEOs. Along with 
the economic and social development, the business environment and talent market will be complete. 
In such a context, separation of ownership and management is easier and less costly to achieve. 
Section 3.4.  Importance of Corporate Governance in Family Business Succession 
Separation of ownership and management alone does not make sure family business with 
professional managers outperform its counterpart. Without developed corporate governance, simply 
separate ownership and management will cause agency problems, which is defined as managers 
sacrifice the owner’s interest to earn personal economic gain. Corporate governance is hence 
designed to solve this problem. 
Just after the economic reform, the corporate governance of Chinese family business was 
also simple. According to Huang (2005), because the professionalism of production factors at that 
time was low, transaction cost caused by opportunism inside the firm was also small; thus, a 
complicated and efficient corporate governance structure did not help much, let alone the cost of 
building such structure was high. Later, along with the continuing economic reform, the Chinese 
government liberalize the financial sector, which prospers the financial industry. Establishing a 
company with outsides resources (especially money) becomes possible, and the organization 
structure of enterprises in the market also changed from dominated by sole proprietorship enterprise 
to limited liability company. On the other hand, after more than ten years of restoration of higher 
education, some people were trained by college, and become capable professional managers. The 
development of the labor market provides enterprises the option to bring outside managers in (even 
though the market is still unmatured, it is better than no existing). Some family businesses started to 
set institutions such as shareholders meeting, board and board of supervisors. However, the majority 
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of positions in these institutions are still occupied by family members, companies still controlled by 
one person and lack of enough monitoring. For example, research by Li (2003) states that among the 
50 sample companies, more than 88% of senior managers in these companies are relatives of the 
owners (as cited by Huang, 2005, p.11). Although corporate governance in Chinese family business 
has been developed, it is still far from mature governance structure in other developed economies. 
A functional governance structure usually consists of three parts, managerial incentive, a 
good board of directors and monitoring mechanism. Among these three parts, the managerial 
incentive is used as an instrument to align the interest of the owner and managers. By doing so, to 
make sure managers’ effort also benefit the shareholder, so that the tunneling activities of managers 
could be minimized. Typical incentive includes monetary incentive and implicit incentive. As the 
name implies, monetary incentive refers to using company performance-related compensation 
packages to align the interest of both managers and shareholders. Implicit incentive refers to 
punishment such as the threat of being fired. As the entity of making critical decisions and in charge 
of the company's overall operation, a well-designed board is crucial to building functional corporate 
governance. The board's quality could be evaluated through the background of board directors and 
the structure of board. To minimize agency problems, a well-designed board should include several 
critical committees such as audit and risk management committee and remuneration committees to 
reduce the chance of tunneling activities. In addition to the internal mechanism, outside monitoring 
is also necessary. Shareholder monitoring is one part of the monitoring system. By introducing other 
institutional investors such as insurance companies and private equity, the family business owner 
could share the burden of supervising outsides managers' daily operations since other investors have 
the same interest as the controlling family. These institutional investors are experienced in 
monitoring the company they invested in. With help from professionals, the family could protect its 
interest better.   
Even though building such a functional governance structure is very costly, but it helps those big 
and global Chinese family businesses improve efficiency when choosing to use outside managers 
rather than handing down business to the next generation. By leveraging the functional corporate 
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governance, Chinese family businesses with professional CEOs could achieve a respectable 
performance improvement with minimizing the agency problems and tunneling activities. As a 
successful Chinese family business that succeeds to a professional CEO, Midea has dramatically 
improved its management efficiency and performance after the succession. Midea’s success consists 
with the hypothesis that the separation of ownership and management is still the optimal choice for 
big Chinese family businesses. The next chapter will analyze Midea’s case and try to find out how 
and why the professional CEO works in this family business.  
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4. Midea Case Study 
Midea is a typical Chinese family business with one principal founder who established the 
company and held the majority share of the company. When coming to succession, unlike most other 
family businesses in China, Midea's founder decided to pass down the management of the firm to a 
professional manager with his family still owning the firm. After the professional manager's 
succession, Midea experienced stable and high growth in terms of both the stock market and financial 
performance. The success of Midea’s professional CEO succession model makes it meaningful to 
analyze how and why outside successor could help the family business to achieve prosperity.  
The rest of this chapter will analyze Midea’s case, starting with section 4.1and 4.2 introducing 
some basic information of Midea such as its history, management change and background of founder 
family’s second generation. By display the equity market return and financial data, Section 4.3 
demonstrates the change of Midea’s stock market performance and financial performance before and 
after the succession. Section 4.4 introduces Midea's corporate governance structure and how it 
supports Midea’s professional CEO succession model. The chapter ends with section 4.5 which 
concludes the case. 
Section 4.1.  Background of Midea 
Midea Holding company is a Chinese private-owned group, and it is a traditional family business 
with majority shares are held by one family. The family is now doing business in many different 
industries, and control these businesses through the entity called Midea Holding. Among these 
businesses, the appliance business, Midea Group, is the earliest, biggest and most important subsidiary.  
Considering the history and importance of Midea Group, this case study mainly analyzes this company 
rather than all businesses of the family. The history and background information of Midea in this 
section is obtained from multi-resources, including business journals, Midea’s official website and its 
annual reports, and the figure is constructed based on them by the author. 
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4.1.1 History and Development  
In 1968, With 5,000 CNY, He Xiangjian established a workshop for the production of plastic 
products in Foshan, Guangdong. Later, the small company entered the appliance industry by producing 
air fan in 1980. One year later, the company renamed Midea. In 1993, Midea proceeded its initial 
public offering of shares (IPO) on Shenzhen stock exchange and became a listed company. With help 
from the capital market, Midea greatly expanded its business over the following years of IPO. Midea 
Group finally became the largest manufacturer of appliances and robots in the world after acquiring a 
German robotic company, KUKA (Bloomberg, 2017). By checking the annual report of Midea, in 
2019, Midea’s total revenue reached 40.5 billion USD, and its net profit attributable to shareholders 
of the company was 3.5 billion USD. Midea’s current market cap is 412.14 billion CNY (equivalent 
to 58.3 billion USD, as of June 24th, 2020). With the brilliant financial performance, Midea group 
ranked 312nd in Fortune Global 500 2020. Despite its dominating position in the domestic market in 
the white goods industry, Midea is also a global company. Midea opened its first oversea factory in 
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, in 2007. It marks the beginning of Midea’s global expansion. Later on, 
Midea formed several joint ventures with the famous American air-conditioner manufactures, Carrier 
Corporation, in many countries. Besides setting oversea production facilities and forming joint 
ventures. Midea also implements its globalization strategy through acquisition. Two famous 
acquisition cases happened in 2016. The first one was the acquisition of Toshiba’s home appliance 
business in 2016, and Midea acquired KUKA later in the same year. Because of the successful 
globalization strategy, as of the end of 2019, Midea had over 30,000 oversea point-of-sales, and 
oversea sales account for over 40% of the total revenue of Midea Group (Midea Group Co., Ltd, 2020). 
Midea’ size and global business model make it a good example to understand how a prominent Chinese 
family business with a professional CEO succeeds under functional governance. 
4.1.2 Ownership and Management Change 
By checking the public business registration information, the family owner, He Xiangjian controls 
Midea Group through his 0.65% shares in the company as well as 94.55% share of the parental 
company of Midea Group, Midea Holding Company (his daughter-in-law owns the rest 5.45% share 
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of Midea Holding). Midea Holding owns 31.73% stakes of Midea Group. Considering the second-
largest shareholder of Midea group, Chinese Securities Finance company only holds 2.84% shares, 
He's family has absolute control over this company. The ownership and control relations between the 
controller and Midea Group are shown in figure 1.           
In August 2005, Midea Electric announced that Fang Hongbo succeed He Xiangjian’s CEO 
position in the company (at that time, Midea Electric was the primary subsidiary of Midea Group, and 
it was also the entity of listed company). In 2009, He Xiangjian also handed over the chairman position 
of Midea Electric to Fang. Finally, along with the decision of re-listing for the entire Midea Group in 
August 2012, the board of Midea Group announced that the de facto controller, He, has decided to 
resign from the position of chairman in the company as well as the position of a board director. The 
chairman and CEO of the Midea Electric, Fang Hongbo, was then named the new chairman of Midea 
Group. At this point, the succession process of Midea group completed, and Fang became the both 
CEO and chairman of Midea group. Unlike other Chinese family businesses that pass down business 
to the next generation of family members, Fang is not a member of the controlling family. He joined 
Midea in 1992 when he was 25 years old and finally grew into a capable professional manager in 
Midea. The succession of Fang marks the separation of ownership and management of this massive 
family business. 
He Xiangjian and His family 
Midea Holding Co., Ltd. 




Figure 1 Ownership of He's Family 
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4.1.3 The second generation and succession  
The succession process in Midea was not as simple as it on paper. In the late 90s last century, 
Midea experienced a significant drop in sales. The founder, He Xiangjian, realized the capability of 
family members in Midea is not good enough to lead Midea into the next phases. Bringing in outside 
talent was necessary. Then, in 1997, Midea first introduced professional managers. The reform of 
Midea’s management team saves Midea’s slumping business. However, the success of the outside 
management team led He to be in a dilemma. He had struggled with the choices of the successor for 
many years since that time. Appointing Fang as the CEO was not the only choice for He. The son of 
him, He jianfeng, is also a capable entrepreneur. Jianfeng established his own business in 1994, started 
as an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of Media. Hereafter, Jianfeng achieved massive success 
in his career and became a controller of several listed companies. When Mr. He supported his son to 
start business in the appliance industry, he did have the idea to train his son as the successor of the 
family business. However, along with the business of Jianfeng had been expanded, he gradually lost 
interest in managing the family business. Instead of working in the traditional manufacturing industry, 
he chooses to pursue his investment business career. Therefore, lacking interest became one of the 
reasons why Mr. He hands down the business to the outside manager. Even though Midea's 
management was not passed down to the next generation, with the help of functional corporate 
governance, Midea still has made huge progress over the past dozen years or so. Midea’s case provides 
a good example of how the separation ownership and management in a family business could help the 
companies go further under a functional corporate governance structure. 
Section 4.2.  Post-Succession Financial Performance 
This section will analyze the impact of Midea’s succession plan through both stock market 
performance and financial performance. The reaction in stock market shows Chinese public attitude 
toward the way of family business succession in Midea. The financial performance of Midea directly 
demonstrates how this family business performs under outsiders’ control. All the data in this section 
are retrieved from Wind Financial Database, a leading financial information and analytic tools 
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provider in China. Wind provides diverse data including equity market data and company’s financial 
numbers. All tables in this section are constructed based on data collected by author. 
4.2.1 Stock Market Performance 
This part will compare Midea's stock return with it of Midea’s competitors in white good 
sectors around the critical dates such as the day when Fang became the CEO of the company.  
           (1). The stock returns around the date when Fang was appointed as the CEO of Midea electric. 
Table 1 shows stock return, excess return, the accumulative excess return of Midea around August 2nd 
2005. (The return of the white-good sector is used as the expected return) 
Date Stock return Expected Return Excess Return Accumulative Excess Return 
7/26/2005 2.34% 1.58% 0.76% 0.76% 
7/27/2005 7.90% 2.30% 5.60% 6.36% 
7/28/2005 -0.77% 0.18% -0.95% 5.41% 
7/29/2005 0.19% -0.04% 0.23% 5.65% 
8/1/2005 0.78% 1.59% -0.81% 4.83% 
8/2/2005 0.38% 1.13% -0.75% 4.08% 
8/3/2005 2.11% 0.78% 1.33% 5.41% 
8/4/2005 -1.31% -0.46% -0.85% 4.56% 
8/5/2005 2.09% 2.41% -0.32% 4.24% 
8/8/2005 2.98% 0.78% 2.20% 6.44% 
8/9/2005 0.36% 1.89% -1.53% 4.91% 
Table 1 Stock Return around the day of Fang’s CEO Appointment in Midea Electric 
In broad terms, the public has a neutral attitude toward the Fang’s appointment as the CEO 
of Midea electric. The accumulated excess return does not change much after the announcement date. 
The result shows the public considers the outside CEO will not have massive impact on the operation 
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of the company. It might because the founder, Mr. He, still held the chairman position, so the public 
thinks it is not a complete succession. 
 (2). Table 2 shows the stock return around the date when Fang was appointed as the chairman 
of Midea Electric. 
Unlike 2005, Fang’s appointment as the chairman prompts the big jump in accumulative 
excess return after the announcement date. It shows the public has confidence in Midea’s future 
performance. Might because of the past performance, investors this time believe Fang as an outside 
CEO will lead Midea to the next phase. It also demonstrates the Chinese public has confidence in the 
separation of management and ownership. If the company is monitored under a functional corporate 
governance structure, they believe a capable outside manager could improve company’s performance. 
Date Stock Return Expected Return Excess Return Accumulative Excess Return 
8/20/2009 6.84% 3.64% 3.20% 3.20% 
8/21/2009 4.20% 2.82% 1.38% 4.58% 
8/24/2009 1.52% 1.64% -0.12% 4.47% 
8/25/2009 0.20% -0.67% 0.87% 5.33% 
8/26/2009 3.57% 3.70% -0.13% 5.20% 
8/27/2009 6.02% 0.04% 5.98% 11.18% 
8/28/2009 -3.78% -2.94% -0.85% 10.33% 
8/31/2009 -6.45% -6.13% -0.32% 10.01% 
9/1/2009 -1.51% -0.07% -1.44% 8.56% 
9/2/2009 4.20% 1.50% 2.71% 11.27% 
9/3/2009 3.20% 13.35% -10.15% 1.13% 
 
(3) Fang’s appointment as chairman was one part of the re-listing and reform plan for Midea 
Group in 2012. After the announcement of the reform plan and appointment of Fang’s chairman 
position, Midea’ stock was suspended about half a year. Table 3 shows the accumulative excess return 




of Midea before and after the announcement. For the day afterward of Midea’s resumption of trading, 
the accumulative excess return of Midea jumped to 40% five days later, compared with the -2.52% 
accumulative excess return before the suspension of stock, the market gives very positive attitude 
toward Midea’s reform plan and Fang’s appointment. One thing that needs to be noticed is that Fang’s 
appointment was only a part of the reform plan. However, although the stock market reaction is a 
response to the whole reform plan, Fang’s appointment was one of the most critical parts. It is 
reasonable to speculate that the public favors the succession of Fang based on the massive jump of 
accumulative excess return. 
Date Stock Return Expected Return Excess Return Accumulative Excess Return 
8/17/2012 -1.06% 0.05% -1.12% 0.68% 
8/20/2012 -0.65% 0.07% -0.72% -0.04% 
8/21/2012 0.54% 1.13% -0.59% -0.63% 
8/22/2012 -0.54% 0.19% -0.73% -1.35% 
8/23/2012 0.33% 1.49% -1.16% -2.52% 
8/24/2012 -0.86% -2.14% 1.27% -1.24% 
4/1/2013 10.02% 0.83% 9.19% 9.19% 
4/2/2013 10.00% -1.15% 11.15% 20.34% 
4/3/2013 9.99% -0.88% 10.87% 31.21% 
4/8/2013 9.98% 0.54% 9.45% 40.65% 
4/9/2013 0.60% 1.05% -0.45% 40.20% 
Table 3 Stock Return around the Day of Fang's Chairman Appointment in Midea Group 
Therefore, during the whole succession process, the attitude of public had changed. From 
neutral and indifference to positive, the public now has the confidence that Midea as a family business 
will be greater under professional managers’ leading.   
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4.2.2 Financial Performance 
The section will analyze the change in performance around the 2012 when Fang officially 
became the chairman of the company. The analysis is based on the profitability, growth capacity, 
capital structure, and operating capability. 
 (1). Profitability. Based on four indicators, net income over revenue, operating income over 
revenue, gross margin and ROE, Table 4 shows the profitability change of Midea from the year 2007 
to 2017.  Before Fang totally had control over Midea in 2012, the net income over revenue and 
operating income over revenue fluctuated around 5%. After the takeover of Fang, both net income and 
operating income over revenue dramatically increased to 6.84% and 7.69% respectively in 2013. In 
2016, the two indicators increased to 9.92% and 10.91%, respectively. The change of another 
measurement for profitability, gross margin, also states the performance improvement. Before 2013, 
the gross margin of Midea was around 19%, after 2013, the data jumped to 27.31% in 2016 and 
fluctuated around 25% because of the successful cost control (Midea, 2017).  Before the succession, 
the ROE of Midea was unstable and experienced a significant drop from 2011 to 2013. After 2013 
when Fang became the chairman, the ROE gradually recovered, and it maintained around 26%. 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net Income/Revenue (%) 5.46  4.15  4.84  5.86  4.96  5.98  6.84  8.18  9.78  9.92  7.69  
Operating Income/Revenue (%) 5.69  4.40  5.22  5.03  5.57  6.82  7.69  9.45  10.70  10.91  8.94  
Gross Margin (%) 19.55  18.88  22.58  18.16  19.12  22.56  23.28  25.41  25.84  27.31  25.03  
ROE (%) 47.16  32.26  24.93  38.86  28.87  24.29  22.55  29.04  28.66  26.62  25.63  
  Table 4 Profitability Indicators of Midea 
 (2). Growth capacity. Figure 2 and 3 shows the change in revenue and net income from 2007 
to 2017, respectively. The revenue bar shows that even though it has some fluctuation, the revenue 
after succession still has an upward trend. Compare with the 114% increase from 2007 to 2012. After 
Fang became the chairman, the revenue in 2017 jumped to 241 billion CNY which is 136% of revenue 
in 2012.  Besides, the revenue experienced a big drop before the succession. After 2012, the growth 
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recovered. The net income graph shows a more straightforward result. Compared with the income 
before the succession, the increase in net income after 2012 is steadier and more obvious. 
 
Figure 2 Revenue and Growth Rate of Midea                Figure 3 Net Income and Growth Rate of Midea 
 (3). Capital structure. The two-year average debt-to-asset ratio provides a more explicit way 
to read the decreasing trend of this indicator. Both the debt-to-asset ratio and current ratio indicate the 
company's liabilities have been dramatically decreased since Fang became the chairman. The increase 
of debt to asset ratio in 2017 is because Midea raises the long-term debt for acquiring KUKA company 
rather than for its daily operation. 
  
 (4). Operating capability. The indicator, net operating cycle, is used to measure the operating 
efficiency; specifically, it calculates how long the one dollar put in the production and sales process 
can convert into cash received. Less net operating cycle indicates a strong capability of converting 
investment into sales and gained cash. The net operating cycle is calculated by days inventory 
outstanding + days Sales Outstanding – days payable outstanding. Table 6 shows a dramatic drop in 
net operating cycle after 2012. Along with the constant days sales to outstanding and days payable 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Debt to asset ratio (%) 68.75  68.94  68.15  69.98  67.42  62.20  59.69  61.98  56.51  59.57  66.58  
Two-year average of Debt 
to asset ratio 68.84 69.07 64.81 60.84 58.04 \ 
Current Ratio 0.99  0.90  1.08  1.15  1.14  1.09  1.15  1.18  1.30  1.35  1.43  
Table 5 Capital Structure Indicators of Midea 
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outstanding, the decrease in net operating cycle can be attributed to the decline of days of inventory 
outstanding, so Midea can convert its inventory to sales in a shorter period of time. It shows that after 
Fang took over the company, the efficiency of production and selling process was improved 
significantly. 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Days Inventory Outstanding (days) 73.14  57.96  60.33  62.41  61.58  67.27  55.36  51.47  44.66  40.60  44.96  
Days Sales Outstanding (days) 15.98  17.80  28.82  23.43  23.49  34.98  26.47  21.97  25.66  26.97  23.17  
Days Payable Outstanding (days) 65.46  52.30  73.89  63.01  58.63  75.83  64.54  64.13  65.90  66.64  60.35  
Net Operating Cycle (days) 23.66  23.46  15.27  22.83  26.44  26.42  17.29  9.32  4.41  0.92  7.78  
Table 6 Operating Capability Indicator of Midea 
The financial analysis indicates, in the post-He era, Midea had achieved great success in terms 
of financial performance. The consistent rising stock price also created huge wealth for its shareholder. 
After the resumption of trading on April 1st, 2013, Midea’s stock has achieved a 550% return as of 
June 27th, 2020. Therefore, Midea has been regarded as a typical “white horse” company (stable earing 
and healthy growth prospect) in the Chinese stock market. 
Section 4.3.  Corporate Governance of Midea 
Usually, the external CEO will cause severe agency problems since the inconsistency of 
interest of two sides. However, Midea’s strong performance proves that the separation of management 
and ownership does not necessarily cause considerable agency problems. If a functional corporate 
governance structure is in place, the outside CEO will have the same interest as the company’s owner. 
A capable professional manager could bring the company into the next phase. Next, the section will 
explore the corporate governance structure inside Midea, to find out how the governance mechanism 
minimizes the agency problem and unifies the interest of owner and agent. The corporate governance 
structure of Midea will be analyzed by three dimensions, incentive structures, the board of directors 
and monitoring.  
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4.3.1 Incentive structures 
The incentive structures are the instruments which are used to align interest from both parties, 
and it can be divided into explicit and implicit incentives. Explicit incentive includes any monetary 
reward to motivate managers such as bonus and stock option. Midea implements its explicit incentive 
mainly through a combination of stock option, restricted stock and straight stock. Employees can gain 
from stock through its price increase and dividends. In most cases, both price’s rising and dividends 
are supported by strong financial performance and stable and sustainable growth. Therefore, unlike 
bonus-based compensation plans which encourage managers to privilege short-term over long-term 
profit, the stock-based compensation package applied by Midea motivates managers to take a long-
term perspective. It is one reason why Midea could keep a high rate of growth for a long time. By 
checking the 2019 annual report, through several employee stock ownership plans, Fang became the 
third biggest stake owner in Midea Group with holding 1.96% shares in total. In 2019, Fang’s fixed 
salary was only 9.63 million RMB, but his gain from stock dividends was 219.2 million RMB. The 
profit he earned from dividends is about 23 times his fixed salary, which means most of his 
remuneration directly relates to the company’s performance. Holding a large amount of stock assures 
that Fang’s interest is aligned with the family owner’s in the long term; hence, minimize the agency 
problem within Midea.   
4.3.2 Board of Directors 
As the entity that protects the interest of shareholders and handles the critical decision in 
firm’s daily operation, the quality of board is crucial to ensure functional corporate governance in 
place. An effective board should include both executive directors and independent directors. To ensure 
the effectiveness of the board, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires the 
board members of the listed company to include at least one-third independent directors. Midea’s 
board has far exceeded the requirement. It consists of 7 directors and has an equal number of dependent 
directors and independent directors. Among these seven directors, 3 of them are executive directors, 
3 of them are independent directors, and 1non-executive director. It is worth mentioning that the only 
non-executive director in Midea is the son of Midea’s founder, and the other six directors have no 
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relation with the founder’s family. Therefore, the composition of Midea's board guarantees the 
management team is under appropriate supervising. The family member as one of the board members 
assures the agent will not hurt the benefits of the family. Besides, Midea also has an effective board 
structure. Like other successful companies, Midea set four committees under its board, including 
Strategy Committee, the Auditing Committee, the Nomination Committee and the Remuneration and 
Appraisal Committee. These committees are designed to offer suggestions and advices to the board; 
therefore, to ensure fairness in the daily procedure and improve the efficiency of decision-making 
process.  
4.3.3 Monitoring 
The monitoring mechanism consists of internal and external monitoring. The Auditing 
Committee is the entity that mainly implements the internal monitoring in Midea. External monitoring 
is performed by several external parties such as external auditors, shareholders and financial 
gatekeepers. The external auditor helps the company minimize financial manipulation; thus, protect 
shareholder’s interest. Midea hires a professional and experienced international external auditor, PwC, 
to ensure the fairness of its financial report. Other shareholders except for the family also play an 
important role in the monitoring system. Because the other stockholders have the same goal as the 
family, they share the responsibility of monitoring. The institutional shareholders such as asset 
management company and investment bank, they have the professionality and experience of 
supervising management team. The background of Midea’s shareholders are diversified, including 
both domestic and foreign institutional investors. Among the top ten shareholders, four of them are 
institutional investors. China Securities Finance Corporation holds 2.84% shares as the 2nd biggest 
shareholder in Midea, and Central Huijin Asset Management Company as the 5th biggest shareholders 
hold a 1.29% stake. Two foreign institutional investors also have huge amount stake in Midea. Canada 
Pension Plan Investment Board and Merrill Lynch hold 1.73% and 0.84% stake, respectively, and they 
ranked as 4th and 7th biggest shareholders in Midea Group. These institutional investors bring their 
experience of corporate governance into Midea, and form an effective monitoring mechanism. Solely 
depends on one family is hard to supervise the whole management team. By leveraging the knowledge 
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and experience brought by these investors, monitoring the management is much easier and more 
efficient. Besides the external auditors and shareholders, the financial gatekeepers such as stock 
market analyst and rating agency also support the shareholder in monitoring the management team. 
The information provided by these gatekeepers is valuable; they provide fair evaluations about how 
the management team performed. As a typical “white horse” stock in the Chinese market, Midea is 
very popular among analysts. Numbers of analysts write reports on it, and they provide rich 
information about Midea’s operation. By checking these third parties’ opinions frequently, the 
controlling family could find any agency problem within the company in time. 
Long-term value-oriented incentive plan, well-structured board and effective monitoring 
together formed a functional corporate governance structure. Midea's incentive system aligned the 
interest of the controlling family and professional manager to mitigate agency problems. A well-
structured board structure ensures the implementation of internal governance is independent and 
impartial. Regarding external monitoring, the existence of several institutional investors makes sure 
the management team is receiving appropriate supervising. The financial gatekeepers provide rich 
information about the company to help the controlling family understand the professional manager’s 
performance. Overall, the functional governance structure of Midea minimizes the possibility of 
agency problems happened in the company. By applying the governance analyzed above. The 
controlling family could enjoy the benefits brought by the capable professional manager and also 
protect its interest at the same time. 
Section 4.4.  Case Study Conclusion 
 Because handing down the business to professional managers, Midea achieved huge success 
regarding its stock market and financial performance. The strong performance in the secondary market 
indicates the public’s favor to professional CEOs and Midea’s separation of ownership and 
management. Regarding the financial performance, after the succession, Midea’s profitability keeps 
going up, the growth capacity remains high, the capital structure was optimized, and the operating 
became more efficient. Its corporate governance plays an important role in the growth of Midea. With 
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functional corporate governance in place, the interest of professional managers is aligned by 
performance-based ownership stock incentive plan, and agency problems are minimized. An effective 
board makes sure the fairness and independence of the decision-making process in senior manager 
level. The son of outgoing leader, He Jianfeng, takes the position of director also ensures the 
management team works for the family’s interest. The diversified shareholders and financial 
gatekeepers share the monitoring responsibility of Midea’s controlling family and use their knowledge 
and experience to help the family supervise the management team more efficiently. Overall, Midea’s 
case proves that the family business with outsides CEO can bring a good result if under the supervision 
of appropriate governance. It also provides a good example of how the family business could leverage 
the talent of professional managers without bearing much risk of agency problem.  
           Despite Midea's success, one thing that needs to be noticed is that not all family businesses in 
China are suitable for Midea’s solution in the current context. Building such a completed governance 
structure is very costly. For the small family business, access to talented managers and directors is 
limited. Even they successfully established the governance system, the complicated and conservative 
decision-making process will sacrifice their advantages as small businesses such as flexibility when 






 The world’s mainstream opinion regarding family business is that hiring a professional CEO 
is a better choice for company’s operation and performance. Many researchers believe lacking 
awareness of poor management quality, implicit commitment in family business and narrowing down 
the CEO choices are the primary causes that lead to the poor performance of dynastic family business. 
However, the researches by Chinese scholars who specifically study Chinese family business shows 
China’s case is a unique one. Compare with family businesses with outside CEOs, the dynastic family 
firms in China have better performance. It can be attributed to the smaller size of Chinese family 
business, less infighting caused by one-child policy, the importance of political connection in China 
and undeveloped Chinese labor market 
           Although the study shows the advantage of family CEOs in China, it is not the best solution to 
the family business. The benefits of family CEOs only exist in certain contexts. (1) It works best in 
smaller and traditional firms instead of a big global family business. When the company’s size is small, 
concentration of ownership and management ensure a flexible reaction to the market change. (2) 
Undeveloped talent market limited family firms’ access to capable professional managers, and it also 
increases the cost and risk of hiring the outside CEO. (3) Family CEOs also perform better in certain 
social contexts such as high corruption. Handing down business to family members ensures the 
succession of political connection. The political connection plays an important role when corruption 
is high and relation-oriented transactions happen frequently. Therefore, combing the consideration of 
both development phase dimension and size dimension, except the small family business, professional 
CEOs is still the optimal choices because of the higher management efficiency. 
           Simply separate ownership and management is not the goal. Without an appropriate governance 
structure, it will cause severe agency problems and hurt the family’s interest. It is essential to have 
governance in place. Midea’s case provides a good example of how a global family business led by a 
professional CEO could achieve huge success under the supervise of functional corporate governance.  
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           The outperformance of family CEOs in Chinese family firms is a temporary result caused by 
certain contexts. The family business succession is a complicated topic that one solution does not fit 
all different types of family businesses. Therefore, from both size dimension and development phase 
dimension, the final statements include three situations: (1) the small family firms have no necessary 
to separate ownership and management at the current stage in China because of the advantages 
mentioned above; hence complete corporate governance is not essential for them; (2) for big Chinese 
family business especially for those have business over the world, they are less impacted by political 
factor and have a vast amount resources to access capable professional managers, so it is better for 
them to have professional CEOs because of efficiency improvement; (3) along with the social and 
economic development, if the problems of corruption and unmatured talent market in China are 
alleviated in the future, hiring outside CEO become less risky and costly. The separation of ownership 
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